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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
t:TAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC., a Utah corporation, JOHN
H. MORGAN, JR., JUSTHEIM PETROLEUJ\I CO., a Nevada corporation, CLARENCE I. JUSTHEIM and
.JOHN H. MORGAN, SR.,
Plaint'iffs and Res7wndents,
vs.
UT AII BOARD OF STATE LANDS,
CH AR LES R. HANSEN, CECIL
THOMSON, D 0 NA L D SHOWALTER, M. V. HATCH, H A R 0 L D
REESE, WHITNEY J. FL 0 YD,
PH ILL IP CHRISTENSEN, T. H.
BELL and W. L. TUELLER,
Defendants and A71pellants.

Case No.

12131

PETITION FOR REHEARING
STATEMENT OF POINTS
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
ARGUMENT
POINT A.
PERTINENT AND IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS ARE BEFORE THE COURT
AS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE, BUT
WERE NOT CONSIDERED.

2

POINT B.
RELATED AND MATERIAL STATUTES DULY
EN ACTED AND PRE SE NTL Y IN FORCE
IIA VE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
POINT C.
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT DISCUSS
OR DECIDE THE MAIN POINT AT ISSUE
'
THE NATURE OF THE MINERAL OIL SHALE
AS IT EXISTS IN NATURE IN THE GROUND.
ARGUMENT
POINT A.
PERTINENT AND IMPORTANT LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS ARE BEFORE THE COURT
AS A MATTER OF JUDICIAL NOTICE, BUT
\VERE NOT CONSIDERED.
This Court's decision needs rehearing and clarifica·
tion in one important respect. The implications go beyond
these parties and the issues here presented. Enlightenment
upon rehearing is indicated for the guidance of the bench
and bar. The Defendants and the Intervenor both cite a
specific reference to a Senate Journal (Intervenor's Brief,
pages 6 and 7, Defendants' Reply Brief, pages 7 and 8)
indicating by an appearance by the Director of the Defen·
dant Board before the Senate as a whole. The
opinion contains this phrase: "While a record of the hear·
ings before the legislature is not before the Court, .. .''
Apparently the message to the
was not considered

Ii:> thi,; court.

the JH"m·isions of Section
(3) t;tah
Code Ann. 195:), "Public and private official acts of the
lqr,i;;J:ctiYe, exec.:utiYe and judicial departments of this state
and of the United States" are matters of which the courts
t:1l;e judicial notice. As long ago as 1896, in Ritchie v.
/iit 1u1rrls, J.1 U. :215, 47 Pac. 670, this court took judicial
ll\Jticc• of legislati\'e journals. In McGarry v. Thompson,
1U U. ,112, 201 P. 2d 288, this court took judicial notice
of public records in the office of the state engineer relative
to water rights. In Holbrook v. Carter (1967), 19 Utah
:Zd
431 P. 2d 123, this court refused to take judicial
notice of instruments filed in the office of the county re( "rd er relative to real property, holding that the same had
not been made matters of judicial knowledge by statute.
The explanation of the legislation in question given by
the then Director of the Utah State Land Board is of critical importance. Certainly, the published SENATE JOUR:\ AL is judicially noticeable. The electronically processed
repwclnction of the oral presentation to the Senate appears
to present a case of first impression insofar as judicial
notice in this state is concerned. The defendants urge that
a listening to the critical record by the Justices or by a
single Justice who is assigned to write the opinion would
be at least as meaningful, and in many cases more meaningful, than would a study of a printed page. It is our position that the record made before the Senate is judicially
noticeable upon one or both of two separate grounds. It
is a formal appearance amounting to an official act of the
Executive Department of the state under the statute and

it is also a public record of the legislative department of
this state unde1· the same subdivision.
A listening to the record will make it abundantly clear
beyond any doubt that the matter was presented to the
legislature in 1967 as a proposed amenctment by which it
was intended to place the hydrocarbons coal and oil shale
in a different category for leasing purposes than oil anrl
gas and those substances sometimes referred to as tar
sands. Once these judicially noticeable matters are reviewed
by this court, it will become apparent that the legislature
was told that it was asked to authorize a single !ease for
oil and gas and tar sands substances, but excluding coal
and oil shale. The interpretation of the Board presented
by its Director is of much importance. The 1970 cumulative
supplement to Volume 50, Am. Jur., at page 28, adds the
following additional footnote 13.5 to Section 325, 50 Am.
Jur., Statutes, "Recommendations of Administrative Officers or Commissions:"
"The views of governmental agencies cooperating in
developing a statute as to its interpretation are entitled to
great weight in construing it." Citing Shapiro v. United

States, 335 U. S. 1, Adams v. United States, 319 U. S. 312.

It is immediately apparent from a comparison of the

majority and dissenting opinions that the statutory amend·
ment in question is ambiguous. In view of such ambiguity,
it is imperative that the pertinent legislative history be
combed for all aspects which would bear on legislative intent. This case should be reheard so that this court can

i'::•!.1 C•lllSidel' the matters presented to the legislature just
i·:·;·,r to

fre enactment.
POINT B.

RELATED A'\'"D MATERIAL STATUTES DULY
ENACTED AND PRESENTLY IN FORCE
EA VE NOT BEEN CONSIDERED.
The majority opinion concludes, erroneously we beliPve, that the legislature "did not attempt to deal with oil
shale or kerogen derived therefrom as a separate mineral."
We disagree strongly, particularly with regard to Sections
G5-1-lll thru 65-1-114, enacted in 1969. The statutory
1•11rases are "oil shale lessees," "the economic recovery of
fuel substances from oil shale," "oil shale technology," and
"the actual amount payable by the lessee under any oil shale
lease." We believe that a rereading by this court of all the
statutory language in context will reveal that the legislation speaks of leases for the oil shale and for nothing else.
And there are other statutes, not considered by this
court nor considered necessary to have been cited in Defendants' previous briefs, treating· oil shale as a separate
mineral. By the provisions of Section 41-11-6 U. C. A. 1953,
there is imposed a tax upon motor fuels - "excepting such
motor fuels sold or used in this state as have been manufactured within the State of Utah from coals, oil shales,
rnck asphalts, bituminous sands, solid hydrocarbons of Utah
... " In this respect at least, manufactured gasoline from
the designated mineral substance is treated differently for
tax exemption purposes than was gasoline from petroleum

occt'.ning in the earth as such, Moreover, Section 65-1-102
Utah Code Ann., enacted in 1961, has reference to tracts
of Ltnd acquired by the State of Utah, but subject to a mineral lease or permit issued by the United States. That stat.
ute authorizes the Defendant Board to recognize the federal
lease or permit and (significantly) to issue a new lease or
permit npon voluntary surrender of the federal right for
the same mineral as could have been covered had the federal lease continued. Separate leasing for oil
is provided by the United States. The citations are contained in
Defendant's previous briefs. The majority decision in this
case is out of harmony with and, in fact, irreconcilable
with the statutory direction that Defendant Board should
administer the lands acquired from the federal government
in accordance with the federal rights.
The following Section 65-1-103 is also out of harmony
with the decision which should be reheard. Under that section, the Board by agreement with a federal agency may
contract as to the administration of a lease where only part
of the lands subject to that lease have succeeded to state
ownership from federal ownership. As noted before, the
federal lease may be for but one of the mineral substances
discussed in this case, the oil and gas, tar sands, or oil shale.
The interpretation by the majority of this court is also
out of harmony with state and federal statutes relating to
unit cooperative or other plans of development of mineral
resources. Under the provisions of Section 65-1-63, the
lessees of mineral leases issued by the State Land Board
are authorized with the consent of the Board to commit

f:',:, [,p Lrnds to a unit, cooperative or other plans of develop-

ment. The unit may involve other state lands, federal lands,
privately owned lands or Indian lands. Where federa.l lands
ate involved, the unitization form is prescribed lly regulations. Under 30 Code of Federal Regulations 226.12, there
is set forth a form of unit agreement for unapproved areas,
Section ;) thereof presc1·ibing that unitized substances are
tlw Gil and gas in and all formations of the unitized lands.
In Jacobson V. State Land Board, 12 Utah 2d 307, 366 P.
70, this court held that the State of Utah must recognize
leases issued by the United States including the right of
extension therein contained. This holding is most difficult
b reconcile with the majority opinion in the instant case
since the federal lease for oil is for but one mineral substance.
POINT C.
THE COURT'S DECISION DOES NOT DISCUSS
OR DECIDE THE MAIN POINT AT ISSUE,
THE NATURE OF THE MINERAL OIL SHALE
AS IT EXISTS IN NATURE IN THE GROUND.
It is respectfully noted that the majority decision in
this case does not consider nor decide the central issue.
That opinion draws the conclusion that the "oil recoverable"
from oil shale is the same as the "oil recoverable" from oil
or gas or the tar sands. The majority opinion seems to
arrive at that conclusion in a general sense and as a legal
conclusion of substantial identity, but recognizes that in
the legislative hearings "certain of the expert witnesses
differentiated kerogen from other hydrocarbons produced

fror;1 othe1· substances." If it be assumed that the majority

is conect that the oils are identical in a legal sense, although different in a scientific sense, that conclusion is not
determinative of the controversy. As the Defendants have
repeatedly urged, and as the intervenors have emphasized
'
the essence of the position of th{' Defendants and of the
intervenol'S is that mineral leases relate to specified mineral
substances as they exist in the ground. Contrary to the
statements in the majority opinion, Defendants' principal
contention does not rest upon the relatively minor chemical
and scientific differences between shale oil and petroleum
or oil derived from tar sands. The essence of Defendants'
position as well as that of intervenor is that the legislature
did not intend the utter chaos and confusion which will
result if the Board is forced to administer its mineral leasing policies according to the end product rather than the
mineral which exists in the ground. Some of the confusion
can be noted from the irreconcilable statutes mentioned in
the argument under the foregoing Point B. The Board may
accept, and has accepted, lands in which the United States
owns the oil and gas deposits and the State of Utah owns
the oil shale deposits. Yet, despite such separation of ownership, it must lease the minerals together, if at all under
the majority opinion. It is required to honor federal leases
for separate minerals, yet it cannot lease those minerals
separately. It has outstanding leases for separate minerals
without objection from the lessees, but yet it cannot let
lessees make new leases for the same minerals. The state
is underlain with large amounts of coal and many coal
leases are outstanding. The instant decision clouds the

authority of the Land Board with respect to oil, gas, tar
sands or oil shale in the same lands should oil or gas be
manufactured from the coal.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons the Defendant and Appellant Utah
Board of State Lands respectfully requests that this case
should be reheard, reconsidered, and the decision of February 26, 1971 vacated.
Respectfully submitted,
SHERIDAN L. McGARRY
Assistant Attorney General

Attorney for Defendants
and Appellants

